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Demography is increasingly being invoked to account for features
of the archaeological record, such as the technological conserva-
tism of the Lower and Middle Pleistocene, the Middle to Upper Pa-
leolithic transition, and cultural loss in Holocene Tasmania. Such
explanations are commonly justified in relation to population dy-
namic models developed by Henrich [Henrich J (2004) Am Antiq 69:
197–214] and Powell et al. [Powell A, et al. (2009) Science 324(5932):
1298–1301], which appear to demonstrate that population size is
the crucial determinant of cultural complexity. Here, we show that
these models fail in two important respects. First, they only support
a relationship between demography and culture in implausible con-
ditions. Second, their predictions conflict with the available archaeo-
logical and ethnographic evidence. We conclude that new theoretical
and empirical research is required to identify the factors that drove
the changes in cultural complexity that are documented by the
archaeological record.
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The idea that demography affects cultural evolution has a longhistory in archaeology. The relationship has been character-
ized in two main ways. The older of the two, which is rooted in the
work of Malthus and Boserup, focuses on the interaction between
demography and the environment, especially the effects of popula-
tion pressure (1–9). Recently, this Malthusian–Boserupian approach
has been eclipsed by what may be called the “population size ap-
proach” (10–13). This approach contends that population size alone
affects cultural evolution. Its key claim is that increases in popu-
lation size lead to increases in cultural complexity, whereas de-
creases in population size result in decreases in cultural complexity.
The population size approach has had a major impact on ar-
chaeology in the past few years. For example, several authors have
suggested that the appearance of indicators of behavioral moder-
nity results from an increase in population size rather than from a
change in cognitive abilities (10, 14–16). Others have used pop-
ulation size decrease to explain the loss of certain technologies,
such as the abandonment of the bow and arrow in Northern
Europe during the Late Glacial period (17, 18). Still others have
invoked population size to explain apparent instances of cultural
stability. Hopkinson et al. (19), for example, suggest that small
population size explains the conservatism of the Acheulean. Such
has been the growth of interest in the population size approach that
the author of a recent review describes it as having “changed how
archaeologists think about socio-cultural change” (ref. 20, p. 11).
The putative link between population size and cultural com-
plexity that is at the core of the population size approach was
identified with formal models. This paper offers a combined theo-
retical and empirical assessment of the most influential of these
models (11, 12). For a model to provide a credible explanation
for a pattern in the archaeological record, it must meet two
conditions: Its components (i.e., its assumptions, simplifications,
definitions) must be defensible, and it must be consistent with
empirical data from relevant cases. Accordingly, we begin by de-
scribing the models of Henrich (11) and Powell et al. (12). We
then investigate whether their assumptions and definitions can be
justified. Subsequently, we evaluate the fit of the models to eth-
nographic and archaeological data. The results of our evaluation
cast doubt not only on the use of the models of Henrich (11) and
Powell et al. (12) to explain patterns in the archaeological record
but also on the population size approach in general.
Models of Henrich and Powell et al.
In this section, we briefly outline the main elements of the models
of Henrich (11) and Powell et al. (12). More technical descriptions
of the models are provided in Supporting Information and Figs. S1–S4.
Henrich (11) developed his model to explain a key part of
Jones’ (21) interpretation of the archaeological record of Tas-
mania. Jones (21) argued that Tasmania experienced a slow
cultural decline from the beginning of the Holocene until contact
with Europeans. Henrich (11) avers that the decrease in the
complexity of the Tasmanians’ technology has to do with their
isolation from mainland Australia following the rise of sea levels
12–10 kya. Henrich (11) contends that the latter event would
have reduced the pool of interacting social learners, and that this
reduction would have led to reduced cultural complexity.
At the heart of Henrich’s model (11) is a process of cultural
transmission we will call “Best.” In Best, each individual in the
older generation has a skill level that expresses how proficient he
or she is at performing a given skill. Individuals in the younger
generation learn the skill from the most skilled member of the older
generation, but this copying process is inaccurate. Consequently,
members of the younger generation will, on average, be worse at
the skill than members of the older generation. It is at this point
that strength in numbers becomes important: Larger populations
have a higher probability of giving rise to learners who achieve
a level of skill as high as or even higher than the level of skill of
the most skilled member of the older generation. Conversely,
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smaller populations are at risk for lacking gifted learners. Even
their best individual is likely to perform worse than the most
skilled member of the older generation. Therefore, over multiple
generations, the average skill level will decrease. Such a scenario
is what Henrich (11) argues to have taken place in Tasmania
after its isolation from mainland Australia.
Two additional elements are required in order for the model to
explain the putative decline in cultural complexity in Tasmania. One
is a definition of cultural complexity. Henrich’s model links skill-
fulness and population size, not cultural complexity and population
size (11). To connect cultural complexity to population size, it is
necessary to define cultural complexity in terms of transmission
accuracy. Under this definition, which is introduced by Henrich (ref.
11, p. 203), a complex cultural trait is one that is hard to copy, and
therefore has low transmission accuracy, whereas a simple cultural
trait is one that is easy to copy, and therefore has high transmission
accuracy. In addition to equating cultural complexity with trans-
mission accuracy, it is necessary to assume that a population ex-
periencing a loss of members cannot counter the latter’s negative
effects on their skill level and can only switch to a cultural trait that
is easier to copy (22). This assumption, which we will call “Com-
plexity Regression,” can be seen at work in Henrich’s model (figure
2 of ref. 11).
Powell et al. (12) presented a revised version of Henrich’s
model (11). Their goal was to explain the regional variation in the
timing of the Upper Paleolithic transition, which they characterize
as the “substantial increase in technological and cultural com-
plexity” during the Late Pleistocene. The key difference from
Henrich’s model (11) is that Powell et al.’s model (12) does not
use Best. Instead, their model is based on a two-stage transmission
process. Learners first undergo vertical transmission (i.e., they
learn from their same-sex biological parent). They then have the
opportunity to improve their skill level by selecting another “cul-
tural parent” proportional to the parent’s skill level. We will refer
to this transmission process as “Payoff.” In simulations of their
model, Powell et al. (12) obtained results that are equivalent to the
results yielded by Henrich’s model (11).
As with Henrich’s model (11), Powell et al.’s model (12) needs
to be supplemented to explain the relevant archaeological pattern
(i.e., the regional variation in the timing of the Upper Paleolithic
transition). Once again, cultural complexity must be defined in
terms of transmission accuracy. Additionally, it is necessary to
assume that when populations increase in size, they will always
opt to shift to more complex cultural traits. We will refer to this
assumption as “Complexity Maximization.”
Theoretical Analysis of the Models of Henrich and Powell et al.
In this section, we assess whether the assumptions and defi-
nitions of the models of Henrich (11) and Powell et al. (12) are
defensible. For a model’s assumption to be credible, either the
results of the model must be independent of the assumption or
the assumption must be supported by empirical data. For a
definition to be credible, either the results of the model must
be independent of the definition or the definition must be
demonstrably better than any competing definition.
Henrich’s Model.Henrich (11) acknowledges that Best is unrealistic
but argues that it is a conservative assumption: If loss occurs even
when parent selection is perfect, it will certainly occur when the
most skilled individual in the population cannot be copied. How-
ever, the simulations of Vaesen (23) show that conformist trans-
mission (i.e., copying the most common behavior) does not yield an
association between population size and skillfulness, and that un-
biased transmission (i.e. random copying) does so only when
population size is in a certain range (Fig. 1). Additional sim-
ulations carried out for this study show that strictly vertical
transmission (i.e., copying from a same-sex parent) also does not
yield an association between population size and skillfulness.
Thus, the results of Henrich’s model (11) are not independent
of Best.
By implication, the results of the model can only be used to
explain archaeologically documented declines in cultural com-
plexity if Best is supported by empirical data. However, Best fails
in this respect. Multiple ethnographic studies suggest that vertical
transmission is the dominant mode of transmission in small-scale
societies (24–28). Some studies provide evidence for oblique
transmission, especially after childhood, but these studies do not
specify the type of oblique transmission (29–33). It could be Best,
but it could also be one of the several other types of oblique trans-
mission that have been identified. A recent study byMacDonald (34)
documents the existence of considerable cross-cultural variation in
types of transmission among hunter-gatherers. With respect to
learning hunting skills, the primary model may be a learner’s fa-
ther, mother and father, uncle, or sibling. Alternatively, individuals
may learn hunting skills from distant kin or from non-kin. Equally
problematically for Best, a recent study focusing on Siberian
hunter-gatherers indicates that individuals often use several types of
oblique transmission (35). The author found that, after a period of
vertical transmission, individuals fine-tune their skills via horizontal
transmission, conformist transmission, or payoff-biased trans-
mission, as well as by individual learning, with the mode of learning
adopted varying by type of trait. Thus, there are no empirical
grounds for assuming that any ancient population used Best.
Rather, the evidence suggests that such populations should be
assumed to have used either strictly vertical transmission or, given
the variation observed in the ethnographic record, vertical trans-
mission followed by unbiased transmission. Neither of these as-
sumptions leads to a robust relationship between population size
and cultural complexity according to the modeling work of Vaesen
(23). Hence, Henrich’s model (11) does not provide a robust ex-
planation for the putative decrease in cultural complexity in Tas-
mania during the Holocene or any other alleged instance of cultural
simplification in the past.
The shortcomings of the model do not stop there. Both the
definition of cultural complexity that it employs and the informal
assumption required to link population size and cultural com-
plexity, Complexity Regression, are problematic. One problem
with Henrich’s definition of cultural complexity (11) is that it is
not the only one that has been proposed. Simon (36), for instance,
argued that cultural complexity should be defined in terms of the
interdependencies among the components of cultural items. In
contrast, Oswalt (37, 38) measured complexity of subsistence tool-
kits by counting the number of different types of tool parts. The
existence of other definitions of cultural complexity would not be
a problem if the other definitions yielded the same results as
Henrich’s model (11), but such is not the case. Querbes et al. (39)
have shown that Simon’s definition (36) only yields a population
size effect in some conditions. Currently, there are no grounds for
Fig. 1. Cultural complexity vs. critical population size N* (the minimal
population size needed for a population not to incur skillfulness loss) for
various biases (described in the main text).
E2242 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1520288113 Vaesen et al.
preferring Henrich’s definition (11) over those definitions put for-
ward by other researchers. Therefore, the results of Henrich’s
model (11) are dependent on an unjustified definition of cultural
complexity, as well as on an unjustified assumption about the na-
ture of cultural transmission.
One major problem with Complexity Regression is that it treats
an individual’s skill level as fixed, which is inconsistent with the large
body of literature on skill acquisition that has been published over
the past 30 y. The literature in question indicates that skill level is
heavily influenced by practice time (40). Learners can thus improve
their ability to perform a given skill by practicing it, which in turn
implies that a population can counter the effects of the loss of gifted
learners on skillfulness by investing more time in learning skills.
Complexity Regression is problematic in yet another respect.
Consider a population that uses fishing nets and is able to catch
100 fish per day. The population is struck by an infectious disease
and loses some members. As a consequence of this loss, their
skill level decreases and they are now worse at catching fish (e.g.,
they can only catch 90 fish per day). How might they respond?
One option is to switch to a simpler skill like hand-line fishing,
which is what Henrich (11) assumes will happen. However, there
are several other possibilities. One is that the population might
do nothing because population pressure has relaxed to such an
extent that its members can survive on the lower returns from net
fishing, because the decreasing benefits of net fishing are offset
by decreasing costs (e.g., catching fewer fish per day requiring a
smaller fishing team), because switching costs do not outweigh
the lower returns from net fishing, and/or because tradition de-
mands it. Alternatively, the population might compensate for the
lower returns by relying more on other resources, by storing
more food, or by engaging in more trade with other populations
(5, 41–43). In these cases, if the strategy prevents a further de-
cline in population size, the population can continue fishing with
nets rather than switching to a simpler skill. Generally, whereas
the outcome of an analysis of costs and benefits can be expected
to vary greatly from case to case, Complexity Regression assumes
only one possible outcome.
In sum, then, Henrich’s model (11) does not withstand theoret-
ical scrutiny. There are problems with both of its key assumptions
and with the definition of cultural complexity it relies on.
Powell et al.’s Model. Given that Powell et al. (12) use the same
definition of cultural complexity as Henrich (11), and that we
have already explained why that definition is problematic, we will
focus on the two assumptions made by Powell et al. (12) when
constructing their model: Payoff and Complexity Maximization.
To reiterate, Payoff is the assumption that cultural transmission
is a two-stage process in which learners first undergo vertical
transmission and then have the opportunity to improve their skill
level by selecting another cultural parent proportional to the
parent’s skill level, whereas Complexity Maximization is the as-
sumption that when a population increases in size, its members
will always opt to adopt more complex cultural traits.
Payoff suffers from the same problems as Best. The fact that
Vaesen (23) has shown that a number of copying processes do
not yield an association between population size and skillfulness
means that the results of Powell et al.’s model (12) also are not
independent of the transmission process they assume. Equally
problematically, there is no empirical support for Payoff. The first
part of Payoff is in line with the available ethnographic evidence,
which, as we explained earlier, suggests that vertical transmission
is important early on (24–28). However, Payoff’s second part
cannot be justified on empirical grounds. One study has reported
evidence for payoff biases in the transmission of skills related to
fishing, growing yams, and using medical plants among indigenous
Fijians (44), but the aforementioned studies by MacDonald (34)
and Jordan (35) indicate that other societies use other forms of
oblique transmission. Consequently, Payoff cannot be assumed to
be universal.
Complexity Maximization has shortcomings too. One of these
shortcomings is the fact that a number of the items that appear
during the Upper Paleolithic are tools or tool parts. The issue here
is that increasing the complexity of a tool can, beyond a certain
level, negatively affect its performance. This phenomenon is well
known in industry (45), but it also applies to the tools produced by
small-scale societies. Consider the type of harpoon used by contact-
era Inuit to hunt seals in open water. Such harpoons typically had
floats attached to them to make it more difficult for the seal to dive.
It is obvious that there is a point at which adding more floats would
make such a harpoon more difficult to use. The harpoon would be
more complex but less effective. Given that complexity can nega-
tively affect the performance of tools, it is unlikely that a population
will always opt to adopt more complex tools.
It is difficult to justify Complexity Maximization in relation to
the other elements of the Upper Paleolithic as well. There is no
evidence that contemporary people maximize the complexity of
their symbolic behavior, ritual artifacts, musical instruments, etc.
Recent history certainly offers examples of change leading to in-
creased complexity, but it also provides plenty of instances of
change that reduced complexity. Given this fact, there is no reason
to assume that ancient populations were “cultural complexity
maximizers” in relation to their symbolic behavior, ritual artifacts,
musical instruments, etc.
Complexity Maximization might be thought to fit with Boserup’s
suggestion that increased population density may induce sub-
sistence stress and that such stress prompts innovation. However,
both theoretical and empirical work has shown that increased
population density cannot be assumed to lead to innovation (5, 46–
48), let alone innovation of a complexity-increasing kind. We have
already outlined one reason for the failure to establish a robust link
between increased population density and innovation: Innovation is
only one of several options available to people to relieve subsistence
stress. The alternatives to innovation include migration, ex-
change, and higher reliance on resources already in the sub-
sistence base (5, 41–43). A further problem with justifying
Complexity Maximization by means of Boserup’s hypothesis is that it
is not clear what Powell et al.’s model (12) adds. If population growth
forces populations to innovate, there is no need to invoke cultural
transmission processes to explain increases in cultural complexity.
So, Powell et al.’s model (12) does not withstand theoretical
scrutiny either. Its key assumptions are problematic, and so is the
definition of cultural complexity it relies on.
Empirical Assessment of the Predictions of the Models of
Henrich and Powell et al.
In the previous section, we showed that there are theoretical
reasons to be skeptical about the use of the models of Henrich
(11) and Powell et al. (12) to interpret the archaeological record.
In this section, we demonstrate that the predictions of the
models are inconsistent with the available empirical evidence.
We begin by showing that the models do not do a good job of
explaining the archaeological patterns they were developed to
explain. Subsequently, we review studies in which ethnographic
and archaeological data have been used to test one of the key
predictions of the models of Henrich (11) and Powell et al. (11)
and the other models that underpin the population size ap-
proach, namely, that there should be a positive correlation be-
tween population size and cultural complexity. We show that the
majority of these studies do not support this prediction.
Henrich’s Model and the Cultural History of Tasmania. As noted ear-
lier, Henrich (11) developed his model to explain a key part of
Jones’ (21) interpretation of the archaeological record of Tas-
mania, which is that the Tasmanians experienced a loss of cultural
complexity during the Holocene. Drawing on the results of his
model, Henrich (11) argued that Tasmania’s isolation from the
mainland led to a reduction of the pool of social learners, and
that this reduction, in turn, resulted in the Tasmanians being
unable to sustain the skills necessary to produce a complex
toolkit. This hypothesis has been widely accepted as accurate, so
much so that the idea that decreases in population size have a
negative impact on cultural complexity is now often referred to as















“the Tasmanian effect” (e.g., ref. 49, p. 272). However, it is
not, in fact, supported by the available ethnographic and
archaeological data.
For Henrich’s hypothesis (11) to be correct, the skills abandoned
by the Tasmanians must have been more complex than those skills
they practiced afterward. Bone points are the only type of artifact
that the Tasmanians are known to have stopped producing (22).
Bone points have been recovered at several sites that date to the
Late Pleistocene or Early Holocene (50), but bone points were not
among the tools used by Tasmanians at the time of contact with
Europeans. Hence, there is no doubt that sometime in the past few
thousand years, probably ca. 4 kya, the Tasmanians stopped making
bone points. Consequently, the key question is “Were any of the
skills that the Tasmanians practiced after they stopped producing
bone points more complex than bone point manufacture?”
The bone points produced by Late Pleistocene/Early Holocene
Tasmanians would not have been difficult to make. Their pro-
duction involved a few simple actions, including fracturing long
bones and rubbing the broken ends on an abrasive surface (50). As
such, they would have been easier to produce than some of the
artifacts that the Tasmanians made after 4 kya. Among these
more-difficult-to-manufacture items are woven baskets, seaworthy
bark canoes, waterproof shelters, and certain stone tools (51). The
skills involved in the production of bone points would also have
been less complex than the skills involved in a number of the
economic and ritual activities that Tasmanians engaged in after
4 kya. These activities include the mining, alteration, and distri-
bution of ochre (52); the creation of necklaces from human bones
and pierced shell beads (53); body scarification (54); and funerary
rituals (53). Thus, a number of the skills that the Tasmanians
practiced after they stopped producing bone points were more
complex than bone point manufacture.
It is also worth noting that much knowledge transfer in Tas-
manian Aboriginal society took place through song, dance, and
stories. Robinson’s (55) diaries make numerous references to the
Tasmanians’ cosmology and creation myths. Similarly, Clark (56)
describes a rich repertoire of song and dance that persisted into the
1830s. There can be no doubt that many of these songs, dances,
and stories would have been more difficult to learn, and therefore
more complex according to Henrich’s definition of cultural com-
plexity (11), than bone point production. Thus, Henrich’s hypoth-
esis (11) fails on this count too.
Given that many of the activities that the Tasmanians were
recorded doing at the time of contact with Europeans were more
complex than manufacturing bone points, there is no reason to
believe that the Tasmanians experienced a loss of cultural com-
plexity as a result of the negative impact on skillfulness of their
isolation from groups on the Australian mainland. (For a more
detailed treatment of the Tasmanian case, we refer the reader to
Supporting Information.)
Powell et al.’s Model and the Upper Paleolithic Transition. To re-
iterate, Powell et al.’s goal (12) was to explain the interregional
variation in the timing of the Upper Paleolithic transition. Having
developed their model, they carried out a two-step empirical
analysis. First, they used molecular data to estimate when different
regions of the world would have reached the same population
density as Europe at the start of the Upper Paleolithic. They then
compared the population estimates with the timing of the Upper
Paleolithic transition in the other regions of the world. Their
rationale was that if the start of the Upper Paleolithic in Europe
represents a substantial increase in cultural complexity as most
archaeologists believe, and if cultural complexity is dependent on
population size, then the Upper Paleolithic transition should occur
in other regions when they have reached the same population
density as Europe at the start of the Upper Paleolithic.
However, Powell et al.’s analysis (12) is inadequate as a test of
their model. According to the model, populations should accu-
mulate complexity whenever their size increases and not just when
they reach a critical size, let alone a critical density. A better
procedure is to examine whether the Upper Paleolithic transition
in various regions of the world took place around the time pop-
ulation size started to increase. Such a reanalysis, in which one
assumes that Powell et al.’s (12) population estimates are reliable,
that their dates for the Upper Paleolithic transition in various parts
of the world are accurate, and that it is unproblematic to use a
package of traits to characterize modernity [but see the severe
criticism by other researchers (57–62)], yields nontrivial vio-
lations of the predicted association in Sub-Saharan Africa,
Northern and Central Asia, Southern Asia, and Australia (a
more detailed treatment is provided in Fig. S5).
Some of these incongruities also appear in Powell et al.’s two-step
analysis (12). The authors suggest these incongruities are due to the
low resolution of their single-locus population estimates, which
were taken from Atkinson et al. (63). However, a recent multilocus
study (64) does not settle the issue in favor of Powell et al.’s analysis
(12). These new estimates give rise to a different set of mismatches.
Most notably, they suggest that the Upper Paleolithic transition
took place in Africa at a time when populations were shrinking (90–
75 kya) and that the Upper Paleolithic appeared in Europe at a
historic population low (Fig. S6). The fact that this new set of
population size estimates challenges the lynchpin of Powell et al.’s
analysis (12), the coincidence between the Upper Paleolithic tran-
sition and a relatively high population density in Europe, clearly
calls into question the reliability of Powell et al.’s results (12).
Significantly, it is not just a question of which set of genetic data-
derived population size estimates to believe. Recent studies by Klein
and colleagues (e.g., 65) address whether larger human population
sizes might explain the sporadic occurrence of more complex be-
havior in the South African Middle Stone Age and whether long-
term population increase over the course of the Middle Stone Age
could explain the emergence of the Later Stone Age at roughly
50 kya. For both cases, they failed to find any association.
Thus, Powell et al.’s model (12) also fails to explain convincingly
the archaeological pattern it was developed to explain. There is no
clear link between the Upper Paleolithic transition and demography.
Tests of the Predicted Correlation Between Population Size and Cultural
Complexity. Population size is not the only factor that has been ar-
gued to affect cultural complexity. Environmental risk (66, 67) and
mobility (68, 69) have also been suggested to influence it. Therefore,
an adequate test of the prediction that there should be a positive
correlation between population size and cultural complexity is one
in which population size is evaluated alongside at least one other
putative driver. So far, eight studies meet this criterion (67, 69–75).
The results of two of the studies are consistent with the pre-
diction. Kline and Boyd (71) found an association between toolkit
complexity and population size in a sample of 10 fisher-farmer
groups from Oceania, whereas Collard et al. (72) found the same
thing in a sample of 45 small-scale food-producing groups from
several continents. In contrast, the results of the other six studies
are not consistent with the prediction (67, 69–75). None of them
identified a relationship between population size and cultural
complexity when other potential driver variables were taken into
account. Four of them found that cultural complexity was only
correlated with proxies for environmental risk (67, 70, 73, 75).
Another found that cultural complexity was correlated with both
environmental risk and mobility. The remaining study concluded
that a change in ecological and demographic conditions is more
likely to have caused the relevant change in cultural complexity
than is population size (74). Thus, the prediction has not fared
well in the studies in which it has been adequately tested. The
most that can be said about the relationship between population
size and cultural complexity is that it is an inconsistent one.
In fact, even this conclusion may overstate the support for the
population size approach. Larger societies tend to have a more
complex social organization (76, 77), which often includes spe-
cialization of tasks (67, 73, 78). Task specialization has the po-
tential to affect the complexity of a society’s cultural repertoire
because individuals need not master all skills and can focus on
learning a small number of more complex tasks (e.g., black-
smithing, carpentry). Task specialization and the mechanism of
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the formal models of Henrich (11) and Powell et al. (12) work
differently. In the former case, complexity is regulated by in-
creased practice time and by the number of types of specialists;
in the latter, complexity is regulated by a population’s size-
dependent ability to bring forth gifted individuals. Critically, for
present purposes, the introduction of task specialization into a
population is likely to increase complexity even though it implies
a reduction of the effective population size for certain skills (i.e.,
a reduction from the entire pool of possible cultural parents to a
pool merely consisting of specialist parents). Consequently, un-
less task specialization is controlled for, finding a correlation
between population size and cultural complexity does not sup-
port the hypothesis that population size drives cultural com-
plexity via the former’s impact on transmission accuracy. Neither
Kline and Boyd (71) nor Collard et al. (72) included task spe-
cialization as a control variable. Thus, their results do not nec-
essarily support the population size approach.
Concluding Remarks
The recent rise in popularity of the population size approach
within archaeology has, to a large extent, been based on the formal
models presented by Henrich (11) and Powell et al. (12) and their
apparent ability to explain the decline in cultural complexity in
Tasmania in the Early Holocene and the regional variation in the
timing of the Upper Paleolithic transition, respectively. In this
paper, we have shown that these models have serious shortcom-
ings from a theoretical perspective. Their results are dependent on
their assumptions, and their assumptions cannot be justified em-
pirically. In addition, there is no reason to prefer the definition of
cultural complexity they use over any of the other definitions that
have been put forward. We have also shown that the models fit the
available empirical data poorly. The ethnographic and archaeo-
logical data from Tasmania are not consistent with Henrich’s
model (11), and the available evidence pertaining to the Upper
Paleolithic transition is not in line with Powell et al.’s model (12).
Thus, the models do not fit the archaeological patterns they were
developed to explain. Furthermore, most adequate tests of the
most basic prediction of the models—that there should be a pos-
itive correlation between population size and cultural complexity—
have returned results that are inconsistent with the prediction.
We contend that these findings cast serious doubt on the
population size approach within archaeology. The fact that the
two most influential models have serious shortcomings is clearly
a cause for concern. However, the problem is wider than that.
The prediction that there should be a positive correlation be-
tween population size and cultural complexity is not specific to
the models of Henrich (11) and Powell et al. (12). It is a pre-
diction of all of the models that have been developed by pro-
ponents of the population size approach (10, 13). Thus, the
failure of the majority of tests of the prediction to support it casts
doubt not just on the models of Henrich (11) and Powell et al.
(12), but on the population size approach in general.
What then, if not population size, drives the increases and de-
creases in cultural complexity that are documented by the archae-
ological record? We have already briefly mentioned the three most
obvious possibilities. One is changes in population pressure as per
the Malthusian–Boserupian approach. Another is changes in the
degree of task specialization in the context of changes in the degree
of social complexity. The third possibility is changes in environ-
mental risk. None of these potential explanatory factors is free of
problems. That population size does not correlate with cultural
complexity in the majority of studies discussed in the previous
section is difficult to square with the Malthusian–Boserupian idea
that population pressure spurs innovation, or at least it is to the
extent that population size is a good proxy for population pressure,
and that innovation involves increases in complexity. It is also dif-
ficult to square with the notion that changes in task specialization
drive changes in cultural complexity, because the latter predicts a
correlation between population size and cultural complexity. One
problem with the hypothesis that changes in cultural complexity are
driven by changes in the level of environmental risk is that although
a number of studies have supported its predictions (67, 70, 73, 75),
some have failed to do so (72, 79). The implication of this is that
environmental risk is probably not a universal driver of changes in
cultural complexity. Further theoretical and empirical research is
required to identify the factor or, as we think more likely, the set of
factors that drove the changes in cultural complexity that are
documented by the archaeological record.
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